








Title of Document: QUESTIONING THE VALIDITY OF THE 
IAT: KNOWLEDGE OR ATTITUDE?  
.   
  
 Eric F. Siegel, M.A., 2006 
  




A series of experiments was conducted to determine if the Implicit Association Test 
is a valid measure of attitude, or if it instead reflects knowledge of the groups being 
tested. Participants were given positive or negative descriptions groups of which they 
had no previous knowledge. They then completed an IAT testing their attitudes 
towards these groups. The results revealed that the IAT was sensitive to whether the 
participants believed these descriptions were accurate. This indicates that the IAT 
measures more than simple knowledge, it is sensitive to whether knowledge is 
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Chapter 1: Literature Review 
1.1  Introduction 
The study of attitudes is one of the largest areas of research in social 
psychology. Although attitude has many definitions, we will define it as a favorable 
or unfavorable evaluation of someone (or something) that is exhibited through beliefs, 
feelings, or behaviors (Greenwald and Banaji, 1995). One branch of attitude research 
focuses on the relationship between attitude and behavior. Unfortunately, the 
association between attitude and behavior has proven tenuous at best; people will 
often express attitudes that have little connection to their subsequent behaviors 
(Festinger, 1964; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977; Fazio & Zanna, 1981; Kelman, 1974; 
Wicker, 1969). There are many possible reasons for the separation between attitudes 
and behavior. One reason that is often an issue in research is fear that an attitude is 
socially unpopular and will lead to criticism from others; researchers call this concern 
social desirability (Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & 
Williams, 1995).  
Participants are often concerned about social desirability in an experimental 
setting because they know their actions are being scrutinized and recorded. Social 
desirability can lead participants to hide their true attitudes, which is a serious threat 
to an experiment’s validity (Clark & Tifft, 1966; Knudson, Pope, & Irish, 1967; 
Paulhaus, 1984).  This problem is particularly acute for research on attitudes towards 
a racial or ethnic group, because modern standards of political correctness have made 




to get accurate measures of prejudice, because people are unwilling to express 
attitudes which could be considered “racist.”  
Recently, researchers have developed a series of implicit measurers which 
they argue can bypass social desirability effects (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 
1995; Hetts, Sakuma, & Pelham, 1999; Jones, Pelham, Mirenberg, & Hetts, 2002; 
von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, & Vargas, Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997). Implicit 
tests are designed so that the test taker cannot deliberately control his responses. 
Proponents of these measures argue this renders them immune to social desirability. 
One of the most popular implicit measures is the Implicit Association Test (IAT) 
(Greenwald, et al., 1998). Every IAT features two groups, and the IAT measures the 
strength of the association between each group and both a positive and a negative 
valence. The relative strength of the associations are used to indicate the test taker’s 
attitude towards the two groups.   
The IAT has enjoyed explosive popularity within the past few years. It has 
been used in hundreds of psychological studies and has begun to see use in 
mainstream applications, such as political polling and as an educational tool in the 
classroom. (Greenwald & Nosek, 2001; Kester, 2001).  Despite the measures’ 
popularity, numerous critics have questioned the IAT’s validity as an attitude measure 
(Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, in press). This research will focus in on one specific 
criticism of the IAT raised by Karpinski and Hilton (2001). They argue the IAT does 
not measure attitude towards the groups; instead it measures knowledge of how they 
are commonly portrayed in the test taker’s culture. The goal of this research is to 




The following paper will first review social desirability and the development 
of implicit measures designed to overcome its influence on attitude measurement.  
We then turn to the IAT itself; the processes that underlie its ability to measure 
attitude, how it is administered and scored, and the evidence that it measures 
knowledge rather than attitude. The paper describes a series of experiments conducted 
to test the core validity of the IAT. Results and implications of the experiment and 
plans for future research are then reviewed. 
1.2 Social-Desirability and Implicit Measurement 
Designing valid methods of attitude measurement has been a persistent issue 
in psychological research[MSOffice2]. One challenge has been controlling for social-
desirability: deception by participants designed to convey attitudes that should lead to 
praise or hide attitudes that could lead to criticism. (Crosby et al., 1980; Crowne & 
Marlowe, 1960; Dovidio et al., 1997; Fazio et al., 1995).  Concern about social 
desirability can cause participants to hide their true attitudes when participating in an 
experiment, which can seriously undermine the validity of an attitude measure. 
Social-desirability has a particularly strong effect on measures of socially sensitive 
topics, such as measures of sexual habits (Knudson, Pope, & Irish, 1967), deviant 
behaviors (Clark & Tifft, 1966), and stereotypes (Sigall & Page, 1971). Because of 
the threat social desirability poses to test validity, it is critical to both understand the 
nature of social desirability and develop effective methods for its control. 
Researchers can use measures of social desirability to control for its effects on 
an attitude measure. They can administer one of these measures along with the 




used to control for social desirability in the main measure. This can be done by 
covarying out the effect of social desirability, or dropping individual questions from 
the main measure that are strongly affected by social desirability (Norman, 1967; 
Karson & O’Dell, 1976).  
Psychologists have been designing measures of social desirability for almost 
half a century. The first test developed to measure social desirability was the L-Scale, 
it was designed as an addition to the Minnesota Muliphasic Personality Inventory 
(MMPI[MSOffice4]) (Edwards, 1957). This scale was later modified for use on a non-
clinical population by Crown[BU5]e and Marlowe (1960) and renamed the Marlowe-
Crowne Scale. This scale is based on the model that social-desirability is a stable, 
single factor personality construct. Responses to the scale indicate the degree to 
which a person will respond according to what he believes is socially acceptable in 
any given situation. The Marlowe-Crowne scale remains the most popular measure of 
social desirability, but other independent measures of social-desirability exist [see 
Paulhaus (1991) for a review of these measures]. 
A dual factor model of social desirability was developed more recently by 
Paulhus (1984). This model divides social desirability is into two distinct factors: 
• impression management-- deliberate, conscious deception on an 
attitude measure designed to garner praise and avoid criticism  
• self-deception -- unconscious deception on an attitude measure 
designed to garner praise and avoid criticism. Participant believe their 




Paulhaus (1984) developed a measure based on this two factor model called the 
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) that has also been widely used 
in psychological research to measure social-desirability.  
 1.3 Methods of Implicit Measurement 
 
Researchers have attempted to sidestep the difficulties posed by social-
desirability altogether by developing implicit measures of attitude (Greenwald & 
Banaji, 1995). An implicit measure is a test in which the construct being measured is 
not directly related to the content of the test itself; this makes it difficult to 
consciously control responses. (Spence, 2006; De Houwer, 2006) In theory, the 
oblique nature of implicit measures neutralizes any attempt by subjects to deliberately 
modify, alter or revise their responses (Banse, Seis, & Zerbes, 2001; Egloff & 
Schmukle, 2002; Kim, 2003). Therefor, social desirability should have no effect on an 
implicit measure. Over the years, a number of different types of implicit measures 
have been developed. 
1.3.1 Projective Measures 
The earliest forms of implicit measures were projective measures such as the 
Rorschach inkblot test and the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT). Projective 
measures are used to infer attitudes or desires from reactions to neutral stimuli. The 
type of neutral stimuli varies by test; the Rorschach test asks participants to describe 
their immediate impressions of an abstract picture (Grønnerød, 2003; Weiner, 2006), 
while the TAT requires participants to create a story to explain an ambiguous scene. 




a bus stop and asked to describe their relationship. The researcher interprets the 
participants’ reactions to the pictures and makes an assessment of their personality 
traits and mental state. While these measures are still used in clinical settings, 
research has demonstrated that these measures lack validity (Garb, Wood, Nezworski, 
Grove, & Stejskal, 2001; Lilienfeld, Wood, & Garb, 2000).  
1.3.2 Biological Measures 
Biological measures such as Galvanic Skin Response (GSR) and 
ElectroEncephograph (EEG) can also be used as implicit measures of attitude (Kozel, 
Revell, Lorberbaum, 2004, Kaiser, 2005). These measures detect arousal levels 
through subtle physiological reactions. These arousal levels can be used to indirectly 
infer attitude.  The GSR detects arousal by measuring the electrical resistance of the 
skin. The test is administered by attaching two electrodes to the skin. A base measure 
is acquired, which is then compared to a measure taken after the experimental 
manipulation. An increase in the participant’s level of skin conductivity indicates an 
increase in arousal. The GSR can be used to study attitude through these arousal 
responses. For example, negative attitudes towards a group can be measured through 
fear responses to members of that group (Lissek, Baas, & Pine, 2005), or it can be 
used to detect sexual arousal to asses sexual preference (Sarlo, Palomba, & Buodo, 
2005). The  EEG is a diagnostic test that  measures electrical activity in the brain 
using recording equipment attached to the scalp by delicate electrodes. The resulting 
EEG data is a record of brain activity, and can identify which areas react to specific 
stimuli. The EEG can be used to study a variety of mental processes which are 




Henriques, 1990), memory (Buckner, Kelley, & Petersen, 1999), and attention 
(Müller & Gruber, 2001). For example, recently it has been demonstrated exposure to 
disliked objects can evoke activity in the amygdale, which controls fear responses 
(Phelps, O’Connor, Cunningham, Funayama, Gatenby, Gore, & Banaji, 2000). 
The usefulness of biological measures is hampered by the difficulty of 
administering them properly. Scores can vary due to differences in the model and age 
of the equipment (Nuwer 1988, 1997). Results from biological measures can also be 
confounded by participant’s age, gender, and state of alertness. These issues make the 
widespread use of these measures problematic 
1.3.3 Reaction Time Measures 
Reaction time measures are a relatively new form of implicit measurement. 
They gauge how strongly the participant associates different concepts and uses these 
associations to infer his attitudes. A concept is a person’s mental representation of a 
person, group, or attribute. Reaction time measures can detect associations between 
three different types of concepts:  
• An object concept is a mental representation of a group, individual, 
inanimate object, or institution.  
• An attribute concept is a mental representation of a trait or 
characteristic.  
• A valence concept is mental representation of positivity or negativity. 
An association is a cognitive link between two concepts. If two concepts are 
associated, activation of one of the concepts speeds up the activation of the associated 




example, since people are likely to see nurses in a hospital, when someone goes to a 
hospital, it will be easier for him to remember what he knows about nurses. (Neely, 
1976, 1977).  Accessibility is the strength of an association --- the greater the 
accessibility of an association, the more one of the associated concepts will aid in the 
activation of the other. Accessibility is increased every time an association is utilized 
(Higgins, 1996).  
When taking a reaction time measure, participants are asked to identify or 
categorize sets of words or pictures which represent groups the experimenter is 
researching. If two of the groups are associated, the participants are able to identify a 
word from one of the sets faster when it is paired with a word from an associated set 
(Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). The method used to pair 
the different sets varies depending on the measure. The decrease in response time is 
used to infer the associations between the groups tested by the measure. When a 
reaction time measure is used to measure attitude, a set positive words and a set of 
negative words are included in the measure. If words from a group set can be 
identified faster when they are paired with positive words, it indicates the group has 
an association with positivity, which indicates a positive attitude towards that group. 
If the words can be identified faster when they are paired with negative words, it 
indicates the participant has a negative attitude towards that group (Fazio, 





1.4 Association Formation 
Associations are formed when people are exposed to information about a 
particular object. If the information describes the object as having a certain attribute, 
a simple association is formed that links the corresponding object concept to the 
corresponding attribute concept. For example, if you are told the Yankees are an 
arrogant baseball team, you would create an association between your conception of 
the Yankees with your conception of the attribute arrogance (Greenwald et al, 2002). 
This association would cause you to remember the Yankees are arrogant whenever 
you thought about them later. As shown in figure one, an object concept can be 
associated with multiple attribute concepts. The links between an object concept and 
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Figure 2: This figure demonstrates a cognitive association network. The object concept (Yankees) has cognitive associations 
with the attribute concepts used to describe the Yankees (Arrogant) and an affective association with the valence concepts based 
on their evaluation (+ + + + and - - - -). The thickness of the connecting lines demonstrates the associations can very in strength. 
 
An unconscious association can also form between an object or attribute 
concept and a valence concept. If a person perceives a certain trait as good or bad, an 
association forms between the corresponding attribute concept and the appropriate 
valence concept (Greenwald et al., 2002). If that attribute concept has an association 
with an object concept, an indirect association forms between the object concept and 
the valence concept. If an object concept has a strong indirect association with a 
valence association, a direct association can form between the object concept and the 
valence concept. An indirect association between an object and valence concept is 
functionally identical to a direct association (Greenwald et al., 2002). Both of types of 




Yankees and negativity (----), and an indirect association exists with the attribute 
concept “arrogant” acting as an intermediary. The formation of a valence association 
can be described using the Yankees example. If you saw arrogance as a negative trait, 
you would form an indirect association between your concept of the Yankees and 
your concept of negativity. This association will cause a negative emotional reaction 
whenever you encounter the Yankee’s logo, and would predispose you to make 
negative judgments about the Yankees. 
Associations form whenever people receive information about a specific 
object. One important issue is whether associations form when people don’t believe 
the information they are based on is true. The answer to this question depends on 
what process people use to judge the accuracy of information. Gilbert, Krull, and 
Malone (1990) argue that when information is first learned, it is assumed to be 
accurate. Later, the new information is reviewed and judged for accuracy. They 
supported this model with a series of studies. In their research, participants were told 
a series of facts about an imaginary animal. They were told some of these facts were 
true and others were false. They found that if the participants read a fact and were 
distracted with a short tone before they were told the fact was false, they were more 
likely to accidentally say it was true when they were questioned later. However, they 
were not likely to say a true fact was false if they were distracted by the tone. Gilbert 
et al. (1990) argued this was because the distraction prevented them from labeling the 
fact as false. The implication of this finding was that the fact was initially encoded as 




The Gilbert (1990) model can be applied to the associations that form from 
new information. When people initially encounter a fact about an object, they will 
assume it is true and form the appropriate association. Later, the information’s 
veracity will be judged. If the information is judged to be false, it will still be stored 
in memory but will “tagged” as untrue. The association that formed based on this 
information should also continue to exist, but will also be “tagged” as an inaccurate 
association. If two concepts are associated, exposure to one concept should still speed 
up the activation of an associated concept from memory, even if the association itself 
is perceived as inaccurate. To put it another way, associations should cause both 
endorsed and unendorsed information to be activated, but the endorsed information 
should determine unconscious attitudes, while the unendorsed information will be 
disregarded. 
1.5 The Relationship Between Conscious and Unconscious Attitudes 
Since reaction time measures detect attitudes indirectly through associations, 
it is important to define how these associations are related to attitudes. Reaction time 
measures are implicit, which means participants’ responses are largely automatic and 
outside of conscious control. The associations detected by reaction time measures are 
also unconscious and cannot be deliberately changed. [MSOffice12]Because of this, 
implicit measures exclusively detect unconscious attitudes, which are distinct from 
conscious attitudes.  Greenwald defines unconscious attitudes as “introspectively 
unidentified traces of past experience that mediate favorable or unfavorable feeling, 
thought, or action toward social objects” (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995, pg 5). In most 




unconscious attitudes. (Fazio, 2001). If a person has an unconscious negative attitude 
towards a group, there should be a stronger association between that group’s object 
concept and the negative valence concept. Conversely, if a person has a positive 
unconscious attitude towards a group, there should be a stronger association between 
that group’s object concept and the positive valence concept. Reaction time measures 
are used to infer unconscious attitudes from these associations. 
The relationship between unconscious and conscious attitudes is still a matter 
of debate (Fazio, 2001). One theory holds that conscious and unconscious attitudes 
are separate constructs. (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooner, 
2000) In contrast to unconscious attitudes, conscious attitudes are the result of 
rational, conscious processing of relevant information. Conscious attitudes are also 
influenced by situational motivations; motivations specific to the situation that affect 
the formation of the attitude. Social desirability is one type of situational motivation, 
but they can be any drive or goal that alters the attitude, such as making a correct 
decision, impressing others, or avoiding a conflict. Because conscious attitudes are 
the result of a deliberate process, they are predictive of controlled, deliberate 
behavior. In contrast, unconscious attitudes have been shown to predict automatic 
behavior which is outside of conscious control, such as body language (Fazio, 1990; 
Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooner, 2000). It is also possible 
that unconscious and conscious attitudes can influence each other; however the exact 
relationship between them is still unclear (Nozek, 2005).  
Another view is that the unconscious attitudes are the only “true” attitudes. 




only influence the expression of the previously formed, unconscious attitudes. This 
means any recorded differences between unconscious and professed attitudes are due 
to the intervention of situational motivations (Fazio, 1990; Fazio & Olson, 2003). 
When situational motivations are in direct opposition to unconscious attitudes, the 
unconscious attitudes will be actively suppressed. However, processing situational 
motivations and suppressing unconscious attitudes requires cognitive resources. 
Therefore, the effect of situational motivations on attitude expression depends on the 
availability of cognitive resources (Bassili, 1995, 1996; Fazio, Powell, & Williams, 
1989; Fazio & Williams, 1986).  This means people will express previously held, 
unconscious attitudes if they are tired or distracted, but if there is time to consider all 
information carefully, situational motivations will have a comparably greater 
influence. The accessibility of the associations that underlie the attitude also 
determines whether the attitude can be suppressed. The more accessible the 
association, the more effort it takes to suppress. (Logan, 1988; Fazio, 1986).  
The Yankees example can be used to demonstrate how situational motivations 
can influence unconscious attitudes. If a person who had a negative attitude towards 
the Yankees moved to New York, he would be motivated by social desirability 
concerns to say he liked the Yankees. He would therefore suppress any negative 
attitude they had about the Yankees. However, suppressing implicit attitudes requires 
mental effort, so if his resources were low, he would be unable to prevent his negative 




1.6 Reaction Time Measures and Attitude 
Reaction time measures test for attitude by detecting for the association 
between an object concept and a valence concept. In order to test for this association, 
stimuli representing a valence concept are presented in conjunction with stimuli 
representing an object concept. If the two concepts are associated, stimuli 
representing one of the concepts will be recognized faster if it is displayed in 
conjunction with a stimulus representing the associated concept. (De Houwer, 2001; 
Fazio, 2001; Fazio et al, 1986 Greenwal et al., 1998). An association with a positive 
valence indicates a positive attitude, and an association with a negative valence 
indicates a negative attitude. For example[MSOffice15], a reaction time measure testing 
attitudes towards insects would display words or pictures related to insects (e.g. wasp, 
fly) in conjunction with both positive and negative words  (e.g. wonderful or awful). 
If the test taker was able to identify or categorize negative words faster when they 
were preceded by insect words, it would imply the test taker has a negative attitude 
towards insects. Reaction time measures can also be used to test for a cognitive 
association between an object concept and an attribute concept. A reaction time 
measure of gender stereotypes would test whether exposure to words representing 
women (skirt, makeup) speeds up the identification of words representing weakness 
(passive, helpless). Supporters of reaction time tests argue they can be used to infer 
whether test taker believes the group posses a certain trait (Greenwald, et al., 2002; 






1.7 The Implicit Association Test 
One of the most popular reaction time measures is the Implicit Association 
Test (IAT), which was created by Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz (1998). Since 
its development, the IAT has in research of many topics, including self-esteem 
(Robinson, Meier, Zetocha, & McCaul, 2005), smoking attitudes, (Huijding, De Jong, 
Wiers, & Verkooijen 2005); and brand preferences (Maison, Greenwald, & Bruin, 
2004). However, the original, and most controversial, use of the IAT is as a test of 
racism (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). 
 The IAT measures the relative preference for one group compared to another. 
Flowers and insects, Democrats and Republicans, and Blacks and Whites are 
examples of groups that have been tested for a relative preference (Greenwald, et al., 
1998). One assumption built into the format of the IAT is the test taker has a positive 
attitude towards one of the groups and a negative attitude towards the other (Blanton 
& Jaccard, 2006). The two groups the researcher is interested in testing for preference 
are called the target sets. A list of positive words and a list of negative words are also 
included in the IAT. These two additional lists are called valence sets. The valence 
sets are often adjectives, such as “wonderful” or “awful.” but can also be nouns, such 
as “cancer” or “joy.” The IAT consists of a series of trials divided into blocks. In each 
trial, a word or picture from one of the sets is displayed in the center of a computer 
screen. The test taker must categorize these stimuli based on their set by pressing a 
key on a keyboard or response box. Generally, there is a key on the left and a key on 




The IAT consists of five blocks of 20-60 trials. Each block has a different 
combination of sets assigned to the answer keys:  
I. In the first block, participants must categorize words or pictures belonging 
to the target sets. One set is assigned to the right answer key, and the other 
to the left answer key. 
II. In the second block, they must categorize the words belonging to the 
valence sets. Once again, each set is assigned to a specific answer key. 
III. In the third block, words or pictures from all four sets must be categorized. 
However, there are still only two answer keys. One target set and one 
valence set is assigned to each answer key. 
IV. In the fourth block, participants must once again categorize words or 
pictures belonging to the target sets. However, the target set assigned to 
the right answer key in block one is now assigned to the left answer key, 
and the target set assigned to the left answer key in block one is now 
assigned to the right answer key.  
V. In the fifth block, the test taker must categorize stimuli from all four sets. 
The two target sets retain the button assignments from block four. This 
means the target sets now share button assignments with the opposite 





Figure 2 - Illustration of the IAT's main blocks (i.e. , Blocks 3 and 5). One word at a time is sampled randomly from the four 
word sets and presented on the computer screen (e. g. birthday). The participant has to categorize the word as belonging to one 
out of four categories using two response keys. The response key assignments differ in the (a) compatible block and (b) 
incompatible block. (Figure from Brendle, Markman, & Messner, 2001) 
 
 If the test taker has a positive attitude towards one of the target sets, that 
target set should have a stronger association with the positive valence set. The test 
taker should also have a negative attitude toward the target set that has a stronger 
association with the negative valence set. These associations are measured by how 
fast the participants can categorize the members of the different sets. This speed is 
measured by Reaction time; the amount of time it takes the test taker to identify a 
word and push the correct answer key for a single trial of the IAT. Reaction time in 
the IAT tends to be between 200 and 800 milliseconds (ms). The associations 
between the target sets and valence sets are measured by the difference in average 
reaction time between the two IAT blocks in which all four sets are presented to the 




to the same answer key as the valence set it is associated with is called the compatible 
block. The test taker is able to categorize the all of the words quickly in this block. 
The block in which each target set is assigned to the opposite answer key as the 
valence set it is associated with is called the incompatible block. In this block, the test 
taker will hesitate and answer more slowly compared to the compatible block. The 
researcher normally designates which block is the compatible block and which block 
is the incompatible block based on his prediction of which group will be liked and 
which will be disliked by the participants. Figure two shows an example of a 
Black/White IAT. The figure demonstrates the how the target sets share an answer 
key with a different valence set in the two critical blocks of the IAT. To obtain an 
IAT score, an average the reaction time is calculated for all the trials in the 
compatible block, and a second average is calculated for the incompatible block.  
Then, the average reaction time in the compatible block is subtracted from the 
average reaction time of the incompatible block to obtain a difference score, the IAT 
effect. The larger the IAT effect, the greater the test taker’s preference the group 
paired with the positive valence set in the compatible block (Greenwald et al., 1998). 
The process underlying the IAT can be explained using a random walk model 
(Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997, Brendl, Markman, & Messner, 2001). In a random walk 
decision process, information is received over time that eventually leads to a specific 
decision or response. When the amount of information in favor of the response 
reaches a decision threshold, the response will be activated. In the case of the IAT, 
the participants are exposed to a word from one of the sets, and they process the 




reach a decision threshold which causes them to hit the appropriate response key. The 
amount of time it takes a participant to reach this decision threshold is his reaction 
time for that trial. In the IAT, a target set’s association with one of the valence sets 
influences reaction time in the compatible and incompatible blocks. When the two 
sets are associated, words from the target set are perceived as having a secondary 
identity as a word from the valence set (Brendl, Markmen, & Messner, 2001). For 
example, in a Flower/Insect IAT “wasp” would be part of the target set “insect” but it 
would also have a secondary identity as a “bad” word.  
In the incompatible block, the target sets are assigned to opposite answer key 
from the valence they are associated with. The participants therefore receive 
information that pushing both keys is the correct response. The participants know 
from the IAT’s instructions and from the blocks of the IAT preceding the 
incompatible block that they are supposed to categorize target sets based on their 
group identity, so they will almost always answer correctly. However, the participant 
must suppress the target words’ secondary identity as valence words, so it takes 
longer to reach a decision threshold for the target sets (Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997, 
Brendl, Markman, & Messner, 2001).  This effect is called response competition. In 
the compatible block, the target set’s dual identity as a valence set increases response 
speeds, because both the association and the target set’s identity leads the participant 
to push the correct answer key. This effect is called response facilitation. The more 
strongly the target set is associated with the valence set, the greater the influence on 




1.8 The Validity of the IAT 
A number of research efforts support the validity of the IAT as an attitude 
measure. IAT scores have been correlated to a variety of behaviors, such as ratings of 
attractiveness (McConnell & Leibold, 2001), roommate preferences (Lambert, Payne, 
Ramsey, & Shaffer, 2005), and even discriminatory hiring practices (Ziegert, & 
Hanges, 2004). The IAT is also sensitive to stimuli that should change the test takers’ 
attitudes, such as diversity seminars (Rudman, Ashmore, & Gary, 2001) and positive 
Black role models (Dasgupta, & Greenwald, 2001).   
Even though the performance on the IAT has been linked to a variety of 
behaviors, research has found a weak correlation between the IAT and explicit 
measures of racism (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000; Karpinski & Hilton, 2004). 
Greenwald et al. (2002) argue this low correlation doesn’t invalidate the IAT, but 
instead brings the validity of the explicit measures into question. They argue explicit 
measures are susceptible to social-desirability, while the IAT is immune. If there is a 
low correlation between the IAT and an explicit measure, the IAT is the more valid 
attitude measure, and the explicit measure is being influenced by the participants’ 
social desirability concerns. (Greenwald, et al., 2002, Poehlman & Uhlmann, 2006).  
However, the critics of the IAT argue it does not measure the participants’ 
attitudes, but a separate construct that in some cases appears to be attitude. The 
criticism we focus on in our research originated from research by Karpinski and 
Hilton (2001). They argued the IAT is a measure of environmental association rather 
than attitude: 
“The IAT may tap the associations a person has been exposed to in his or her 




score on a White/Black IAT, for example, should not be seen as indicating that the 
individual has more favorable evaluations of Whites compared with Blacks. Instead, 
the score may simply indicate that the individual has been exposed to a larger number 
of positive-White and negative-Black associations than negative-White and positive-
Black associations.” (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001, pg 776) 
 
If the IAT is a measure of the associations participants have been exposed to, it would 
not account in any way for whether the participants believe those associations are 
true. If Karpinski and Hilton (2001) are correct, it would mean the IAT effect 
measures the participants’ knowledge of how the groups in the IAT are perceived by 
others, rather than their attitudes towards the groups. This criticism can be tied into 
Gilbert’s (1990) theory of fact labeling. According to this model, people should have 
associations based on both endorsed and unendorsed information, but their attitudes 
should only be based on the endorsed associations. Since unendorsed associations still 
speed up the activation of the associated concepts, the IAT may detect both endorsed 
and unendorsed associations. Unendorsed association would not indicate attitude; 
instead they are an indication of the test taker’s knowledge about the group. If this is 
the case, the IAT could not be considered an attitude measure, but rather a simple 
memory exercise. 
Karpinski and Hilton (2001) supported their criticism of the IAT with a series 
of studies. Their first study compared the IAT’s ability to predict behavior against 
other explicit measures. In one study, they administered an IAT and explicit measures 
assessing participants’ attitudes towards apples and candy bars. They found that there 
was no correlation between the IAT and the explicit measures. However, the explicit 
measures predicted whether the participants would prefer to receive a free apple or 




experiment demonstrated that explicit measures are more effective at predicting 
behavior than the IAT for a behavior unaffected by social desirability concerns. 
In a second experiment, Karpinski and Hilton (2001) demonstrated that IAT 
results could be manipulated through a task that created associations between the 
target sets and the valence sets of the IAT. Participants performed a memory task in 
which they were asked to memorize a series of word pairs. The words belonged to 
either a “youth” target set, or an “elderly” target set. In one condition, the youth set 
was paired with positive words while the elderly set was paired with negative words;  
in the other condition the sets were given the reverse associations. Participants then 
completed an elderly/youth IAT and a series of explicit measures that tested for 
attitudes towards  the elderly and youths. Karpinski and Hilton (2001) found that the 
IAT recorded a preference for whichever group was paired with the positive words in 
the memory exercise. In contrast, the explicit measures recorded a bias for youth and 
against the elderly, regardless of the associations that were learned in the memory 
task. These results demonstrated IAT performance can be based on simple exposure 
to information, without taking into account whether the test taker believes that 
information is accurate. The results were particularly effective at demonstrating this 
point, because the participants were told that the memory task was unrelated to the 
rest of the experiment. This means that IAT performance can be influenced by 
associations which aren’t even related to the groups being tested. Although there was 
no manipulation check testing whether the participants suspected the memory task 
was related to the IAT, it seems unlikely that they would make the connection. 




affect the experiment, because IAT performance is resistant to conscious 
manipulation. 
1.9 The Present Research 
Karpinski and Hilton’s (2001) study supports their assertion that the IAT may 
measure knowledge rather than attitude. However, there were several shortcomings in 
their research which the present research will address. First, by using preexisting 
groups in their study, it is unclear how the participants’ preexisting attitudes towards 
the groups affected the results. For example, in the first experiment, both the IAT and 
explicit measures detected a preference for apples. It could be argued apples and 
candy bars are portrayed both positively and negatively in American culture. 
Karpinski and Hilton (2001) argue apples have a more positive image than candy bars 
in American culture. However, it is possible that the larger number of commercials 
and advertisements for candy bars create positive associations which balance out the 
negative. Therefore, it is uncertain what IAT results would indicate a true attitude 
versus an environmental association in the case of apples and candy bars.  
Karpinski and Hilton’s (2001) second experiment was also confounded by the 
possibility the participants had preexisting associations. It is possible that the 
participants had both positive and negative associations about the elderly and youth. 
Instead of creating associations, the learning exercise may have made one set of 
associations temporarily more accessible.  For example, in our society, the elderly are 
often stereotyped as being set in their ways and a burden on younger generation, but 
are also viewed as experienced and patient. It is possible that the participants in 




the priming procedure strengthened one stereotype temporarily. If this effect was only 
temporary, it would mean the IAT could normally be an effective measure of attitude, 
and the learning task merely disrupted its effectiveness for a short time. 
 An effective method of controlling the effect of pre-existing knowledge on the 
IAT results would be to administer an IAT featuring groups the participants have 
never heard of before. To accomplish this, we utilized fictional groups and an 
experimental methodology created by Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji (2005).  Their research 
focused on the difficulty of changing pre-existing attitudes held about a group.  To 
test this, Gregg, et al. (2005) created two fictional groups. The participants were 
taught to associate one group with a positive valence and the other with a negative 
valence.  After learning these associations, the participants were told the associations 
they learned were incorrect and were taught the opposite associations.  Gregg, et al. 
(2005) found that the participants’ IAT scores did not respond to the retraining, but 
they did change their responses on explicit measures. This experiment was meant to 
demonstrate unconscious associations are difficult to change after their initial 
formation. However, Gregg et al. (2005) were assuming that the IAT is an accurate 
measure of affective association. An alternative explanation is that the explicit 
measures reflected the participants’ updated attitudes, but the IAT reflected their 
initially learned associations, which they no longer endorsed. 
 In the current experiment, descriptive information about these fictional 
groups will be presented in such a way that the participants will learn associations 
based on the information, but will not endorse what they learn. This will allow us to 





Chapter 2: Experiment 1 
2.1 Purpose and Overview 
2.1.1 Purpose 
The purpose of  experiment 1 was to provide an initial test of whether the IAT 
measures simple associations between words, or if it can capture attitudes.  To 
eliminate the influence of prior knowledge, the two groups used in the experiment 
were fictitious. The groups and the names of the group members were taken from a 
previous experiment (Gregg et al., 2005) and had been tested to make sure initial 
attitudes towards them would be neutral. Participants were then taught to associate 
each group with a specific set of adjectives. In one condition, the adjectives were 
presented with a negative modifier which nullified the meaning of each adjective. In a 
second condition, the adjectives were unmodified. If IAT scores are not sensitive 
reversed meanings of the negated words, it would mean the IAT measures simple 
associations between the words. These simple associations have little to do with 
unconscious attitude. If the IAT is able to account for the reversed meanings of the 
negated words, it would suggest the IAT reflects the attitudes which form in response 
to those words.  
2.1.2 Overview 
In the context of a memory experiment, participants were taught about two 
fictitious groups. Through a learning task, the participants were taught to associate 
one of the groups with a set of positive adjectives and the other group with a set of 




by the word “not” when the participants were learning the associations.  In the “not 
absent” condition, the adjectives were unmodified. The participants were then given 
an explicit measure which tested their explicit group preference. After completing the 
explicit measure, the participants were asked to take an IAT which featured the two 
fictitious groups they had learned about. Our main hypothesis was that the explicit 
measure would reflect the reversed meaning of the adjectives in the “not present” 
condition, but the IAT would not be sensitive to the adjectives reversed meanings. In 
the “not absent condition, the two measures would record a similar attitude in the 
participants. 
The experiment also counterbalanced for the order of the compatible and 
incompatible blocks in the IAT, and the adjective list with which each group was 
associated. Therefore, the experiment had a split plot design, with type of measure 
(IAT vs. explicit) as a within subject variable and the “not condition” (not present vs. 
not absent), IAT block order,  and the pairing of the adjective/group associations 
(Luupite positive vs. Niffite positive) as between subject variables. 
2.2 Participants 
Participants were drawn from the introductory psychology research pool at a 
large state university in the Mid-Atlantic. All of the participants were over the age of 
18. Participants were given an hour of research credit for their participation. Data was 





After reading and signing the consent form, participants were seated in a small 
room containing a computer and given oral instructions complemented by on-screen 
text. The participants were told that the purpose of the experiment was to test how 
knowledge about a group affects one’s ability to identify and categorize its members.  
The researcher explained that the experiment used groups the participant had never 
heard of before in order  to prevent the influence of prior knowledge and/or bias.   
The two groups were called the Luupites and the Niffites. There were eight  
members in each group, who could be identified by the structure of their names:  
Luupite names all contained double vowels and ended in –lup, Niffite names all 
contained double consonants and ended in –nif. The groups were adopted from a 
previous experiment (Gregg et al., 2005) which demonstrated the initial attitudes 
towards them would be neutral Participants were told in reality they were ancient 
historical groups, but that the group’s names and the names of the group members 
had been changed so that they wouldn’t be recognized.  
The participants were told that they would learn about the groups through a 
learning exercise in which each group would be paired with a set of adjectives. The 
format of the learning exercise was outlined, and a brief explanation of the IAT’s 
format was also presented. The IAT was described as the “testing phase” of the 
experiment, in which the participants would be tested to see if they had learned what 
the groups were like. They were told that the better they had learned about the groups 




After receiving these instructions, the participants began the learning task. 
Upon completion, participants continued on to the explicit measure, and finally the 
IAT. The participants did not receive further oral instructions from the experimenter 
before taking the explicit measure or the IAT. Instead, on screen instructions were 
presented that explained the format of each new section of the experiment.   After 
completing the IAT, the participants were debriefed about the purpose of the 
experiment. 
2.3.1 The Learning Task 
The learning task consisted of a series of trials that were similar in format to 
the IAT.  In each trial, a name from one of the two groups appeared in the center of 
the computer screen. The name presented in each trial was randomly selected from a 
list of all the names. The participants had to categorize the names into Luupites and 
Niffites by pressing the correct key on an answer box. There was a right answer key 
and a left answer key. In each trial, the Luupites were assigned to one answer key, 
and the Niffites were assigned to the other. The names of the two groups were 
displayed in the upper corners of the screen, and their location (right or left corner) 
corresponded to the answer key assignments. The answer key assignments were 
randomly changed in each trial to prevent the participants from associating the groups 
with a specific answer key. If the participants correctly categorized a name, a blue 
“C” appeared on the screen; an incorrect response resulted in a red “X” 
 Twenty practice trials were conducted to familiarize the participants with the 
format of the learning task. After this practice phase, the main learning task began. 




positive adjectives and a list of negative adjectives. The adjectives were flashed on 
the screen for 200 ms., sufficient time for the participants to consciously detect and 
recognize the adjectives. The adjectives were immediately followed by a name from 
the appropriate group. Throughout the entire learning phase, one set of adjectives 
(positive or negative) preceded the names of one group, and the other set of adjectives 
preceded the names of the other group. The participants were told by the 
experimenter that these adjectives were accurate descriptions of the names and the 
groups to which the names belonged. Both groups were presented in an equal number 
of trials in the learning phase. 
The form in which the adjectives were presented to the participants was varied by 
condition: 
1. In the not present condition, all the adjectives in the learning task were 
displayed with the word “not” preceding them. For example, if the Luupites 
were paired with the list of positive adjectives, the Luupite names would 
preceded by the adjectives “not wonderful” and “ not fantastic,” while the 
Niffite names would be preceded by the words “ not horrible” or “not awful.”  
2. In the not absent condition, the adjectives were presented unmodified. For 
example, if the Luupites were paired with the positive adjectives, the Luupite 
names would preceded by the adjectives “wonderful” and “fantastic,” while 
the Niffite names would be preceded by words “horrible” or “awful.” 
The adjective list associated with each group was counterbalanced: 
1. For half the participants, the Luupites were associated with the positive word 




2. For the other participants, the Niffites were associated with the positive word 
list and the Luupites with the negative word list. 
2.3.2 Explicit Measure 
Participants’ attitudes towards the Luupites and the Niffites were also assessed 
with an explicit measure. The participants were instructed that the measure used the 
number pad on the keyboard rather than the response box, and to respond based on 
how they felt about the two groups. The participants were first asked to complete the 
statement “I think the [Luupites/Niffites] are…” Participants responded on a seven 
point scale anchored with the phrases “very bad” (1) and “very good” (7). Then they 
were asked to complete the statement “I like the [Luupites/Niffites]…” The response 
scale was anchored with the phrases “not at all” (1) and “very much.” (7). Both 
questions were asked once about each group, so there were a total of four questions. 
 
2.3.3 The IAT 
The participants’ implicit associations were assessed using a Luupite/Niffite, 
good/bad IAT. Participants were given instructions on the computer screen before 
each block of the IAT. The instructions explained the new button assignments 
featured in each block, and instructed the participants to be as quick and accurate as 
possible. The IAT consisted of five blocks: 
§  Block 1, participants classified the adjectives into categories based on their 
valence (Bad and Good).   
§ Block 2, they classified the names of group members into categories based on 




§ Block 3 was a combination of the first two blocks in which all four groups 
were presented.  
§ Blocks 4 and 5 corresponded to Blocks 2 and 3, except that responses for the 
Niffites and Luupites now have the button assignments from block 3.  
As in the learning task, the groups featured in each block appeared in the upper 
corners of the screen, and their location corresponded to the button assignments for 
that block. 
The Luupite and Niffite names and the adjective lists utilized in this IAT were 
the same as the ones featured in the learning task. It is important to note that in the 
“not present” condition, the “nots” were absent during the IAT. Furthermore, the 
designation of blocks as compatible and incompatible was based on which adjective 
list each group was associated with in the learning task, regardless of the presence of 
the “nots.” For example, if the Luupite names were associated with the adjective “not 
wonderful” in the learning task, the IAT block where the Luupites were assigned to 
the same answer key as the positive word list was considered the compatible block. 
The order of the IAT blocks was also counterbalanced across participants:  
1. For half the participants, the compatible block was presented in block three of 
the IAT and the incompatible block was presented in block five.  
2. For the rest of the participants, the incompatible block was presented in block 







2.4.1 Explicit Measure 
A Cronbach’s Alpha was calculated for responses to the explicit questions to 
see if the scores could be combined. We predicted that participants in the not present 
and not absent conditions would have opposite scores on the measure, so a separate 
Alpha was calculated for each condition. We also predicted the participants would 
give opposite responses for the questions referring to the Luupites and the Niffites, so 
we calculated separate Alphas for each group. Table 1 lists the results for the alpha 
tests, which indicated it would be acceptable to combine the responses for the two 
questions concerning each group. This created one attitude score for the group 
associated with the positive adjectives, and a second score for the group associated 
with the negative adjectives. These designations did not take into account the 
presence of the “nots,” so in the not present condition, the group paired with the “not 
negative” adjectives was considered the negative group. Each participant’s average 
rating for the negative group was subtracted from their average rating of the positive 
group. This created a relative preference score which could be compared to the 
relative preference score of the IAT.  
Table 1 
Cronbach’s Alpha- Experiment 1   
     










α .922 .976 .89 .991 





After creating the explicit preference scores, a 2 (not present vs. not absent) by 2 
(IAT block order) by 2 (adjective/group association) univariate ANOVA was 
performed to determine if the method factors affected responses. The only significant 
finding was a main effect for the “not” variable, F (29)= 21.296, p ≤ .05. Because the 
group association and block order had no effect on the results, they were not included 
as variables in further statistical tests.  
Overall, the participants had a greater preference for the positive group in the not 
absent condition (M=2.096, SD= 4.317), but the not present condition, the 
participants showed a preference for the group associated with the negative words 
(M= -4.516, SD= 2.141). As we predicted, the participants rated the group associated 
with the positive adjectives positively in the “not absent” condition, but in the “not 
present” condition they reversed the valence of the adjectives and rated the groups 
accordingly. 
2.4.2 The IAT 
As with the explicit measure, we first performed a data reduction in order to 
calculate a single score for IAT performance. Since IAT scores are based on reaction 
times, calculating a single IAT score can be a complex process. Reaction time data 
can be difficult to analyze due to the high variability in response times, both between 
participants and within each participant’s set of trials. In addition, IAT trial response 
time distributions tend to have a positive skew. The method used to convert IAT data 
into a normal distribution is a subject of debate among IAT researchers. The 
algorithm we utilized was based on the one recommended by Greenwald and Banaji 




(2003), because it was intended for performing correlational analyses. In order to 
perform an analysis of variance it was necessary to perform additional data 
transformations to standardize the data across participants. Our final scoring 
algorithm was as follows: 
1. Eliminate trials greater than 10000 ms 
2. Log transform trial scores 
3. Transform each subject's log transformed trial scores into z-scores based on 
that subject's (and only that subject's) scores. 
4. Calculate an average of the participants’ performance for the compatible block 
and an average for the incompatible block (blocks three and five) 
5. Calculate a difference score between the two z-scores (from step 4). 
6. Transform the difference scores into z-scores based on the mean and SD of all 
the participants’ difference scores. 
This created a single score for each participant. A higher score indicated a greater 
preference for the positive group over the negative group. 
As with the explicit measure, a 2 (not present vs. not absent) by 2 (IAT block 
order) by 2 (adjective/group association) univariate ANOVA was performed on the 
participants’ IAT scores to determine if the method factors effected the results.  The 
results revealed that the “not” manipulation was the only variable to have a 
significant effect on the IAT, F (29)= 4.189, p= .05. Because the group association 
and the IAT block order had no effect on the results, they were not included as 




Overall, the participants showed a greater preference for the group associated with 
the positive word list in the not absent condition (M= 58 ms., SD= 167 ms.) but in the 
not present condition, the preference was for the group associated with the negative 
adjectives in the associative learning exercise (M= -78 ms., SD= 87 ms.). Contrary to 
our predictions, IAT scores reflected the reversed meanings of the adjectives in the 
not present condition. 
Table 2 
Means of Participant Response on The IAT & Explicit Measure; 
Experiment 1   
     
 IAT  Questionnaire 
Condition Not Absent Not Present Not Absent Not Present 
Mean 58 -78 2.096 -4.516 
Standard 
Deviation 167 87 4.317 2.141 
N 16 13 16 13 
2.4.3 Implicit and Explicit Comparison 
A final set of analyses was performed to test if the participants demonstrated a 
different degree of preference on the two types of measures. A significant correlation 
was found between participants’ performance on the implicit and explicit measures r 
(29) = .431, p=.02. In order to assess whether the relationship between the two 
measures interacted with the “not” manipulation, separate correlations were 
calculated for the not present and not absent conditions. Neither correlation proved to 
be significant (not present condition: r (13) = .167, p=.586, not absent condition: r 
(16) = .049, p=.858). Finally, a 2 (not present vs not absent) by 2 (implicit measure vs 




no significant interaction between measure and reversal, F (29)= 2.977, p = .096. 
Both measures   were sensitive to the reversed meaning of the adjectives in the not 
present condition, and responses on the two measures appeared to be similar. 
2.5 Discussion 
The purpose of this experiment was to demonstrate that IAT scores are based 
on simple semantic associations between words. If the IAT is based on such simple 
associations, it can not reflect participants’ attitudes. To test this, an experimental 
condition was created in which the participants learned associations between two 
fictional groups and positive or negative words. The meaning of the adjectives was 
manipulated by the presence or absence of a “not” modifier. The “not” manipulation 
should reverse the associations formed between the groups and a valence concept. 
These associations were recorded by the explicit measure. However, the associations 
between the group names and adjectives should not reflect the reversed meanings of 
the adjectives. We hypothesized these associations would be reflected in the IAT 
scores.  
Contrary to our predictions, our results showed that IAT scores reflected the 
reversed meanings of the adjectives. This finding demonstrates the IAT is more than a 
measure of simple associations between words; it reflects associations with a valence 
based on the meanings of those words. These findings demonstrate that the IAT can 




Chapter 3: Experiment 2 
The first experiment demonstrated that the IAT reflects evaluations of a group 
rather than associations between specific words and a group. These are the types of 
associations which create unconscious attitudes. However, not all evaluations of a 
group are endorsed, and it is possible that the IAT reflects these unendorsed 
evaluations. We therefore conducted a second experiment in which endorsement of 
the learned associations was manipulated so that the overall association between 
group and valence would not be endorsed by the participants. 
3.1 Overview 
The procedure for the second experiment was similar to the first. In the 
context of a memory experiment, participants were taught to associate adjectives with 
the Luupites and Niffites. Through the learning task, the participants learned to 
associate one of the groups with a set of positive adjectives and the other group with a 
set of negative adjectives. One difference from the previous experiment was the “not 
present” variable was eliminated and replaced by an endorsement variable: we 
manipulated whether the participants’ endorsed the associations between the groups 
and the adjectives. 
The participants were given the same explicit measure and IAT as in the 
previous experiment. We predicted that the explicit measure would reflect a relatively 
neutral preference for the groups when the participants were taught not to endorse the 
associations. In contrast, IAT scores would record a preference for the positive group. 




varied between participants. We predicted increased training of the associations 
would lead to a greater preference on the IAT. We hypothesized that increasing the 
length of the training would increase the strength of the association between the 
groups and the adjectives, but would have no effect on how much those associations 
are endorsed. Therefor, if IAT scores reflected the length of the learning phase, it 
would indicate the IAT measures strength of association rather than endorsement. The 
experiment also counterbalanced for the order of the compatible and incompatible 
blocks in the IAT, and the adjective list with which each group was associated. 
Therefore, the experiment had a split plot design, with type of measure (IAT vs. 
explicit) as a within subject variable and the endorsement condition (endorsed vs. 
unendorsed), IAT block order, and the pairing of the adjective/group associations 
(Luupite positive vs. Niffite positive) as between subject variables. 
3.2 Participants 
The participants for the experiment were from the introductory psychology 
research pool from a large state university in the mid-Atlantic. Participants were 
given an hour of research credit for their participation. Data was recorded for a total 
of 45 participants. 
3.3 Procedure 
The basic procedure was identical to that of the first experiment: Participants 
completed the learning task, then the explicit measure, and then the IAT. The primary 




3.3.1 The Learning Task 
The procedure for the learning task was similar to that of the previous 
experiment. However, the learning task featured a new experimental manipulation: 
1. In the endorsement condition, the participants were told that the adjective sets 
accurately described the groups they were paired with in the learning task, and 
that the adjectives could be used to form an accurate impression of the two 
groups. Since they had no knowledge to the contrary, the participants should 
have believed the adjectives accurately described the groups. 
2. In the non-endorsement condition, the participants were told even though each 
adjective set was paired with a specific group, they did not accurately describe 
the group. In order to convince the participants that the adjective sets did not 
describe the group they were paired with, the participants were asked to flip a 
coin to determine which adjective set each group was paired with in the 
learning task. Therefore, the participants should not have believed the 
adjectives accurately described the groups. 
The length of the associative learning task was also manipulated: 
1. In the short condition, the learning task consisted of 120 trials 
2. In the long condition, it consisted of 240 trials.  
The two method factors that were counterbalanced in the first experiment were 
also counterbalanced in the second experiment. The first was the assignment of 
adjective list to group in the learning phase: 
1. In the first condition, the Luupites were associated with the positive word list 




2. In  the second condition, the Niffites were associated with the positive word list 
and the Luupites with the negative word list. 
In the non-endorsement condition, the assignment of the adjective lists was based 
on the participant’s coin flip. In the endorsement condition, the adjective lists were 
randomly assigned to a group. The participants were not aware the adjective lists 
were randomly assigned in the endorsement condition. 
3.2.2 Explicit Measure 
In addition to the four questions featured in Experiment one, a new question 




3.3.3 The IAT 
After completing the explicit measure, the participants took the 
Luupite/Niffite, good/bad IAT. The instructions and procedure for the IAT were 
                                                 
1
 This question was added because during pilot testing, some participants 
demonstrated a preference for one group over the other on the explicit measure in the 
non-endorsement condition. When questioned during debriefing, the participants said 
even though they didn’t really believe the groups were good or bad, they felt 
compelled,  when asked,  to have some form of group preference. These responses 
indicated that because of their prior participation in experiments, some of the 
participants’ believed it was unusual or unacceptable to give a neutral answer on an 





identical to the previous experiment. The order of the IAT blocks were 
counterbalanced to control for order effects:  
1.  In one condition, the compatible block was presented in block three of the 
IAT and the incompatible block was presented in block five.  
2. In the second condition, the incompatible block was presented in block three, 
and the compatible block was presented in block five.  
After completing the IAT, the participants were debriefed about the purpose of the 
study. 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Explicit Measure 
The method used to calculate the explicit scores was identical to the method 
used in the previous experiment. The alphas indicated it would be acceptable to 
combine responses to the two questions asked about each group. They were combined 
using the same method as in the previous experiment.  
Table 3 
Cronbach’s Alpha- Experiment 2   
     










α .751 .817 .603 .63 
N 19 19 26 26 
After calculating the explicit preference scores, A 2 (endorsement vs. non-
endorsement) by 2 (implicit measure vs. explicit measure) by 2 (short learning phase 




repeated measures ANOVA was run, and the results revealed that the endorsement 
manipulation was the only variable to have a significant effect on the explicit 
measure, F(29)= 52.443, p ≤ .001. Participants demonstrated a greater preference for 
the positive group in the endorsement condition (M=4.5, SD= 1.87) compared to the 
non-endorsement condition (M= .31, SD= .99). These results supported our 
prediction that the participants endorsed the information they learned about the 
groups. 
3.4.2 The IAT 
The method used to calculate IAT scores was identical to the method used in 
the previous experiment. After calculating the IAT scores, a 2 (endorsement vs. non-
endorsement) by 2 (implicit measure vs. explicit measure) by 2 (short learning phase 
vs. long learning phase) by 2 (IAT block order) by 2 (adjective/group association) 
univariate ANOVA was performed. The only significant finding was a main effect of 
the endorsement variable, F (1)= 43.676, p≤ .001. The IAT recorded a much greater 
preference for the positive group in the endorsement condition (M= 196, SD= 240) 
than in the non-endorsement condition (M=52, SD=199). An independent samples t-
test revealed this difference was significant, t (43)= 2.209, p=.033. Contrary to our 
predictions, the IAT was sensitive to the participants’ endorsement of the 
group/valence associations.  
 
Table 4 
Means of participant Response on The IAT & Explicit Measure;  
Experiment 2   
     









Mean 196.085 52 4.5 .31 
Standard 
Deviation 240 199 1.87 .99 
N 26 19 26 19 
  
 
3.4.3 Implicit and Explicit Comparison 
A final set of analyses was performed to test if the participants demonstrated a 
different degree of preference on the two types of measures. There was a weak 
correlation between participants’ performance on the implicit and explicit measures, r 
(45) = .241, p=.111. In order to assess whether the relationship between the two 
measures interacted with the endorsement manipulation, separate correlations were 
calculated for the endorsement and non-endorsement conditions. Neither correlation 
proved to be significant (endorsement: r (19) = .046 p= .851; non-endorsement: r (26) 
= -.127, p= .537). A 2 (endorsement vs. non-endorsement) by 2 (implicit measure vs. 
explicit measure) repeated measures ANOVA revealed there was no significant 
interaction between the type of measure and the endorsement variable, F (44)= 1.277, 
p = .265. Although the similarity in preference recorded on the two measures was 
weaker than in the previous experiment, there was still no significant difference in the 
participants’ responses on the two measures. 
3.5 Discussion 
In this experiment, the IAT demonstrated sensitivity to the participants’ 




group did not describe them, the IAT evaluations were neutral. In both conditions, the 
participants’ preference on the IAT corresponded to the preference recorded by the 
explicit measure. These results imply the IAT is sensitive to whether participants 
endorsed the associations they learned. Furthermore, IAT scores were not affected by 
the length of the learning phase. This implies the strength of the learned associations 
do not affect IAT scores. However, it is also possible that the variation in length was 
not sufficient to create a variation in strength.  
However, it is possible that the participants in the non-endorsement condition 
put less effort into learning the associations, because they were told the associations 
were meaningless. If they didn’t learn the associations, then the neutral IAT response 
would reflect a lack of knowledge rather than a lack of endorsement. This possibility 
could not be evaluated based on the findings in experiment two, so a third study was 
designed to control for participant learning. 
Chapter 4:  Experiment 3 
4.1 Overview 
A new type of question was added to the learning phase in order to clarify 
whether the participants learned the associations. These new questions tested the 
participants to see if they knew which adjective set was associated with the Luupites 
and which was associated with the Niffites. Other than this new question type, the 
procedure for experiment three was similar to the previous experiment. We predicted 
that participant’s IAT scores would demonstrate a preference for the positive group in 




contrast, the explicit measure would show no preference between the groups when the 
associations were not endorsed.  
The length of the learning task was not varied in this experiment because 
length had no effect in the previous experiment. Additionally, the IAT block order 
and the adjective/group associations had no significant effect in the previous two 
experiments, so they were also not included. This created a 2 (endorsement vs. non-
endorsement) by 2 (implicit measure vs. explicit measure) split plot design. 
4.2 Participants 
The participants for the experiment were drawn from the introductory 
psychology research pool of a large state university in the mid-Atlantic. Each 
participant was given an hour of research credit for their participation. Data was 
recorded for 49 participants in total. 
4.3 Procedure 
The procedure of the third experiment was similar to that of the second 
experiment, with a few modifications. During the learning task, each Luupite and 
Niffite name was paired with a specific adjective from the appropriate list. For 
example, if the positive words were associated with the Luupites as a whole, the 
adjective “wonderful” might be specifically paired with the name “Neenolup.” In the 
learning phase, each group name would be preceded only by the adjective with which 
it was paired.   
 Participants were presented with a test question every tenth trial of the learning 




one of the adjectives from the sets was presented in the middle of the screen. Two 
names from the group the adjective’s set was associated with appeared in the upper 
corners of the screen. One of the names presented was paired with the adjective on 
the screen. Just as with a regular trial from the learning phase, the location of the 
names corresponded to the buttons they were assigned to on the answer box. The 
participant had to identify which specific name the adjective always preceded by 
pushing the appropriate button.  
After completing the learning task, the participants completed the explicit 
measure, and then the Luupite/Niffite IAT. The procedure and instructions for these 
measures were identical to those of the previous experiment. 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Test Questions 
The participants’ responses to the test questions were analyzed to determine if 
they had successfully learned the associations. The participants’ accuracy score was 
calculated based on the percentage of the test questions they had answered correctly. 
Participants were coded as having learned or not learned the associations based on 
whether their accuracy was above 50%, which indicated better than chance 
performance on the test questions. Only four participants performed below 50% 
accuracy. There was no difference in the results if these participants were excluded, 




3.4.2 Explicit Measure 
The method used to calculate the participants’ explicit scores was identical to 
the method used in the previous experiment. The alpha scores indicated it would be 
acceptable to combine responses to the two questions asked about each group, so they 




Cronbach’s Alpha- Experiment 3   
     










α .723 .69 .814 .765 
N 23 23 26 26 
 
There was a greater preference for the positive group by the participants in the 
endorsement condition (M= 3.09 SD= 1.64) than in the non-endorsement condition 
(M=1.2857 SD=1.75), an independent samples t-test revealed this difference was 
significant: t (47)= -3.678, p= .001. As we predicted, the explicit measure was 
sensitive to the participants’ endorsement of the information they learned about the 
groups. 
4.3.3 The IAT 
The method used to calculate IAT scores was identical to the method used in 
the previous experiment. After calculating each participant’s IAT score, descriptive 




(M=167.085, SD= 208.829) in the endorsement condition than in the non-
endorsement condition (M=17.8200 SD=98.140). An independent samples t-test 
revealed this difference was significant, t (47) = -3.331, p = .002. Contrary to our 
predictions, the IAT was sensitive to whether the participants endorsed the 
associations they learned about the groups.  
 
Table 6 
Means of participant Response on The IAT & Explicit Measure; 
Experiment 3   
     






Mean 167 17 3.09 1.2857 
Standard 
Deviation 208 98.140 1.64 1.75 
N 21 28 21 28 
3.4.5 Implicit and Explicit Comparison 
A bivariate correlation was used to compare participants’ performance on the 
implicit and explicit measures. There was a weak but non-significant correlation 
between participants’ performance on the implicit and explicit measures, r (49) = 
.199, p= .126. In order to assess whether the relationship between the two measures 
was affected by the independent variable, separate correlations were calculated for the 
endorsement and non-endorsement conditions; neither correlation proved to be 
significant (endorsement: r (21) = .192, p= .404; non-endorsement: r (28) = -.142, p= 
.472). A 2 (endorsement vs. non-endorsement) by 2 (implicit measure vs. explicit 
measure) repeated measures ANOVA results revealed there was no significant 




p= .651. These results offer no evidence that the endorsement manipulation affected 
the two measures differently. However, individual participants’ did not have similar 
responses on the two measures. 
4.6 Discussion 
The results for this experiment were almost identical to the previous 
experiment. The IAT still recorded a preference for the positive group in the 
endorsement condition, which disappeared in the non-endorsement condition. There 
was still a moderate, though weaker, correlation between the IAT and explicit 
measure. However, the inclusion of the test questions eliminated the possibility that 
the participants did not learn the associations in the non-endorsement condition. This 
strengthens the conclusion that IAT performance reflects endorsed associations rather 
than simple knowledge.  
Chapter 6:  General Discussion 
 
In a series of experiments, the IAT’s ability to distinguish between knowledge about 
groups and the attitudes towards those groups was tested. In Experiment 1, we tested 
whether the IAT detects simple associations between words, rather than associations 
between group concepts and valence concepts. This is important because associations 
with valence concepts are the primary determinant of attitude (Greenwald et al, 
2002). To test this, we had participants learn to associate groups with sets of positive 
or negative adjectives. In one condition, all of the adjectives were preceded by a 
negative modifier which reversed their meaning. If scores IAT did not reflect the 




associations to an overall valence. We found that the IAT detected the reversed 
valence of the negated adjectives. This indicated that the IAT measures the 
associations between a group and a valence, which are the primary source of 
unconscious attitudes.  
After establishing that the IAT detects associations with a valence, we tested 
whether it only detected associations which were endorsed. In Experiment 2, we once 
again had participants learn to associate groups with sets of positive or negative 
adjectives. The participants were told that the adjectives either did or did not describe 
the groups. When the participants were told the adjectives did not describe the 
groups, they should have still formed the valence associations through the learning 
exercise, but they should not endorse those associations. The IAT only detected a 
preference in the participants when they were told the adjectives accurately described 
the groups. These results indicate that the IAT is sensitive to the participants’ 
endorsement of  the learned associations.  In Experiment 3, we replicated the results 
of Experiment 2 while controlling for the participants’ success at learning the 
associations. We again demonstrated that the IAT measures more than simple 
knowledge; we showed that it is sensitive to participants’ endorsement of the 
information they have about a group.  Since only information people believe is true 
should determine attitudes, these results support the IAT’s use as an attitude measure. 
 As a group, these experiments address a critical issue concerning the validity 
of the IAT. Our research can be tied to Gilbert’s (1990) theory of how information is 
falsified. Gilbert argues information that is unendorsed, or believed to be false, is still 




is discounted and has little influence on attitudes. It is possible that unconscious that 
are unendorsed are also tagged as false. Critics such as Karpinski et al. (2001) suggest 
that, rather than measuring attitudes, the IAT  reflects the participants’ knowledge of 
the groups being tested. In Gilbert’s framework, this would mean IAT scores are 
based on both associations tagged “accurate,” and associations tagged “false.” The 
IAT could not be an effective attitude measure if it is influenced by them associations 
tagged false, because such associations have little effect on attitude. 
Karpinski et al. (2001) supported this criticism by demonstrating that IAT 
scores could be influenced by unendorsed information learned through a task similar 
to the one we used in our experiments. However, they used groups which the 
participants already had knowledge of, so it is possible that their learning task merely 
primed pre-existing endorsed associations. Consequently, the effect of the associative 
learning task on the IAT recorded by Karpinski et al. (2001)  might not have 
demonstrated that the IAT measures knowledge rather than association.  Our research 
was an attempt to support Karpinski’s criticism while controlling for the participants’ 
prior knowledge of the groups.  This was accomplished by utilizing groups  
previously unknown to participants. We then taught the participants associations 
which we told them were not accurate, so they should have been labeled “false.” If 
the IAT measures knowledge rather than association, these “false” associations 
should have had a strong influence on IAT scores.  We found the “false” associations 
appeared to have very little influence on IAT scores. This implies that the IAT is only 




Karpinski et al’s (2001) findings, our results imply that the IAT is sensitive to the 
participants’ endorsement.  
   While the current research supports the validity of the IAT as a measure of 
attitude, there was only a low to moderate correlation between IAT scores and the 
explicit measure in our experiments. This leaves open questions about the IAT’s 
validity.  Supporters of the IAT attribute low correlations to the effect of social 
desirability on explicit attitude measures. A recent meta-analysis by Poehlman and 
Uhleman (2006) found that the correlation between the IAT and explicit measures is 
lowest in studies of racism, where social desirability should have a strong effect. 
However, the present study utilized groups which were unfamiliar to the participants, 
so social desirability should not have been a factor. Since social desirability is not a 
plausible explanation for the low correlation, another factor must affect IAT 
performance, and is responsible for the low correlation.   
One explanation for the low correlation is that the IAT measures preference 
for one group over another; it measures positive attitudes towards one group and 
negative attitude towards the other. The attitude towards just one of the groups can 
not be determined from IAT scores. In contrast, explicit measures tend to detect 
attitudes towards a single group. This makes it hard to compare IAT scores to most 
explicit measures because they are measuring different constructs. (Ashburn-Nardo, 
Voils, & Montieth; Blanton & Jaccard, 2006). This concern could be addressed by 
modifying the IAT so that it includes a third, neutral group. Researchers could 
compare the increase or decrease in reaction time for trials featuring the two groups 




two separate, one for each group. These group specific measures of bias may have 
higher correlations to explicit measures of bias. 
The test taker’s cognitive ability is another factor which may interfere with the 
correlation between the IAT and explicit measures. The influence of individual 
cognitive factors on the IAT is an area that needs further study, and is a potential 
explanation for the low correlation between the IAT and explicit measures. There is 
empirical evidence that cognitive skill can influence IAT performance (McFarland & 
Crouch, 2002; Mierke, & Klauer, 2001, 2003, 2005). Mierke & Klauer (2001) 
conducted research on the influence of task switching on the IAT. They found that on 
individual trials in the incompatible block of the IAT, participants performed more 
slowly on trials featuring a word from a target set which were preceded by a trial 
featuring an adjective. This was because the adjective primed the participants to focus 
their attention on the word’s valence information, and they have to refocus attention 
to the next word’s group identity; which is called “task-switching.” Participants were 
able to perform faster on trials featuring group members that are preceded by trials 
also featuring group members. These trials are called “task congruent” because 
attention is already focused on group identity. Cai, Sriram, Greenwald and McFarland 
(2004) claim this effect can be neutralized using their recommended scoring 
algorithm. The effect of cognitive skill on IAT performance, and the ability of the 
scoring algorithm to counter it, needs to be tested experimentally.  
 The IAT has tremendous potential as a research tool for psychologists.  If it is 
an effective attitude measure, it has numerous applications both in academic research 




critical that its validity as an attitude measure be confirmed. The present research 
tested one such challenge to the IAT, and the results supported its use as an attitude 
measure. If research continues to support the IAT’s validity, it will make a welcome 
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